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Work, Consumption, and the Joyless 
Consumer 
Raymond Benton, Jr. 
Consumerism is only the other side of the degradation of work-the 
elimination of playfulness and craftsmanship from the process of pro-
duction. 
-Christopher Lasch (1984, p. 27) 
W en the hot discussions in marketing were concerned with broaden-ng the marketing concept, Thaddeus H. Spratlen pointed out that uch interest was largely confined to extending its application rather 
than expanding its orientation. "That is," Spratlen wrote, "its operational 
domain is being extended, not its philosophical domain" (1972, p. 403). In the 
years since Spratlen wrote, the operational domain of marketing has indeed 
expanded, so much so that Nikhilesh Dholakia (1985) recently questioned 
whether the marketing wave is even stoppable. 
During this period of expansion, however, few marketers bothered to 
investigate, scrutinize, or criticize marketing's philosophical base. Conse-
quently, marketing has not been significantly broadened in the philosophical 
sense. It is time to stop and look into, or behind, that philosophical base, to 
question it, and perhaps to criticize it. There is, after all, sufficient evidence, 
both empirical and anecdotal, to suggest that economic growth and goods 
consumption is not necessarily correlated with the feeling of well-being by the 
people who participate in the process. 
Empirically, research suggests that there has been "no marked and signif-
icant increase in the self-perceived happiness of Americans to accompany the 
An earlier version of this chapter was presented at the Eleventh Macromarketing Seminar, August 
7-10, 1986, in Boulder, Colorado. The research and writing was made possible, in part, by a grant 
from the May Stores Foundation. Helpful comments and criticism from Professor A.R. Gini, 
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very substantial rise in the standard of living that has been achieved in the 
postwar period" (Rescher 1980, p. 7; see also Easterlin 1973, 1974; Leiss 
1984). Anecdotally, on a recent morning commuter train ride, a perfect 
stranger-a young, well-dressed man in a gray three-piece suit (a lawyer?)-
voluntarily commented, in response to a conversation I was having with the 
person sitting next to me, "My wife and I both work and we make lots of 
money. We have the house, the BMW, and the Mercedes, and we take the trips. 
Generally we buy anything we want. But you know what? This yuppie trip has 
got to be the most unfulfilling thing we have ever experienced." 
Similarly, on Nightline on December 25, 1985-Christmas night, of all 
nights-Ben Wattenberg of the American Enterprise Institute commented, in 
response to the suggestion that maybe the baby-boomers are spending more 
(which they are and which Wattenberg presented as evidence that things are 
getting better) but might be finding that they cannot buy happiness, 
Well, you know, money can never buy happiness. The only thing that anyone 
intelligent would say that money can buy is the absence of specific miseries. It 
can prevent you from having clothes with holes in it [sic] or leaky windows, or 
it can give you a nice car. It can prevent certain unhappinesses but it doesn't 
buy happiness. No one ever said it does. 
Indeed, despite widespread agreement among traditionalists that we must 
"get the economy moving again," Paul Wachtel might very well turn out to be 
correct in saying that "greater economic productivity is not what will relieve 
our distress and that the pursuit of economic growth may actually make things 
worse" (1983, p. 9). Explaining how this could be is part of the purpose of this 
chapter. 
The question is not why we believe that consumption brings happiness-
we believe it because we have taught ourselves to believe it-but-to borrow 
from Jeremy Seabrook's What Went Wrong? Why Hasn't Having More Made 
People Happier? (1977)-to understand contemporary patterns of consumer 
behavior, as well as contemporary patterns of consumer dissatisfaction and 
restlessness, one must understand consumer behavior in its relation to other 
domains of human experience (in this case, in its relationship to work and 
working). In brief, the argument is that much of contemporary consumption is 
a form of compensation for the lack of meaningful work. Consequently, the 
origins of our culture of consumption, as well as of contemporary patterns of 
consumer behavior, cannot be understood apart from an understanding of the 
progressive degradation of work during the twentieth century. 
On Work and Consumption: The Theoretic 
We need a theoretical understanding that will correct and compensate for the 
traditional understanding that work is merely something we do to obtain the 
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means (money) to acquire consumption goods. We need to understand that, as 
Hannah Arendt expressed it, "the things of the world ... are of a very different 
nature and produced by quite different kinds of activities" (1958, p. 94). 
The Activities and the Products 
Every European language, ancient and modern, contains two etymologically 
unrelated words for what we have come to think of as the same activity, and 
retains them in the face of their persistently synonymous usage. To illustrate, 
Arendt considered several languages and their respective words: Ancient Greek 
-ponein and ergazesthai; Latin-laborare and facere or fabricari; French-
travailler and ouvrer; German-arbeiten and werken; English-labor and 
work. The distinction between them is the distinction between "the Labour of 
Our Body and the Work of Our Hands," a phrase Arendt borrows from John 
Locke's Second Treatise of Civil Government. It is a distinction reminiscent of 
that made by the ancient Greeks between the cheirotechnes (the craftsman, to 
whom the German Handwerker corresponds) and those who, like "slaves and 
tame animals with their bodies minister to the necessities of life." 
In all cases, only the equivalents for labor have an unequivocal connotation 
of pain and trouble. The German arbeit applied originally only to farm labor 
executed by serfs and not to the work of the craftsman, which was called werk. 
The French travail/er replaced the older labourer and is derived from tripalium, 
a kind of torture. In classical Greek, ponein connoted labor; in modern Greek, 
its derivative, ponei, simply connotes pain and hurt. The words for work, on 
the other hand, unequivocally connote creativity. These distinctions are main-
tained, as well, in popular idiomatic expressions. Consider the difference in 
implied meaning between the idioms "a labor of love" and "a work of art." 
Just as we can distinguish between kinds of activities, between labor and 
work, so, too, can we distinguish between the things of the world, between 
consumption products and use products. In English, consumption is etymolog-
ically derived from the Laton consumere (to use up, eat, waste) and has the 
unmistakable connotation of destroying, doing away with, or devouring. 
Similarly, use is derived from the Latin uti (to use) and, while more general than 
consume, it connotes a sense of using as in employing or employing for a given 
purpose without the connotation of destroying, wasting, or devouring the 
thing used even though it may, in the process, be "used up." 
The Relationships 
The distinction between labor and work was ignored in classical antiquity and 
has been ignored in the modern age as well. There is not a single theory in which 
animal laborans and homo faber are clearly distinguished (Arendt 1958, p. 85). 
The distinction between productive and unproductive labor made by the 
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classical economists, however, goes to the heart of the matter because it 
embodies the fundamental distinction between work and labor. The mark of all 
laboring is that it leaves nothing behind. The results of its effort are almo~t as 
quickly consumed as the effort is spent, because l~?or pro~uces th?,~e.thmgs 
destined for consumption. Despite the apparent futility o.f this effort, 1~ is born 
of a great urgency and motivated by a more powerful dnve than an!thmg else, 
because life itself depends upon it" (Arendt, p. 87). For that reason, it cannot be 
escaped. 
The mark of work, on the other hand, is that it creates permanence, 
stability, and durability. The products of work pro~ide the permane.nt a~d 
durable world within which we find the consumption goods by which hfe 
assures the means of its own survival. "Needed by our bodies and produced by 
its laboring, but without stability of their own, these thi~gs for incessant 
consumption appear and disappear in an environment of things that are not 
consumed but used, and to which as we use them, we become used and 
accustomed" (Arendt 1958, p. 94). . . 
The ideals of Homo faber are the creation of permanence, stab1hty, and . 
durability. The ideal of animal labor ans is the production of abundance, the 
dream of growing wealth, "the happiness of the greatest number." The age-old 
dream of the poor and the destitute is the dream of the modern era: to 
emancipate people from that which is necessary. Indeed, the contempt ~or 
laboring originally arose out of a passionate striving for freedom from necessity 
(Arendt 1958, p. 81). 
For the ancients, the way to achieve the dream was through the ensla~e­
ment of others. They felt it necessary to possess slaves .because of t~e slavish 
nature of all occupations that served the needs for the mamtenance .of hfe. What 
people share with all other forms of animal life was not considered to be 
human· slaves were not consequently, considered human. It was not, however, 
their c;pacity to be hu~an that was denied, but only their humanity when they 
were totally subjected to necessity. Indeed, peasants, who were not st.aves but 
did provide the necessities of life, were classified by Plato as well as Anstotle.as 
natural slaves. To be a master of slaves was the human way to master necessity 
(Arendt 1958, pp. 82-83). . 
The modern era has striven to eliminate the realm of necessity, t~at. of 
labor, through the mechanization of the producti~e process, thereby rehev1~g 
people of the necessity of producing what nece~sanl~ ~ust be produced, while 
at the same time producing an abundance of it. It is m part that dreai:n, the 
dream of liberation from the realm of necessity through the production of 
abundance that lies behind the hope "that scientific and technological progress 
would res~lt in enhanced human satisfaction/contentment/happiness" (Re-
scher 1980, p. 4). . . 
The hope was that the division of labor, the breakdown ~f ope~at1ons l~to 
their simple constituent motions, and their consequential remtegratton 
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through "teamwork," together with the application of machine technology, 
would deliver people from their human condition, from the necessity to 
"labor." What actually happened, and this is one of the ironies of the modern 
world, is that by dividing, subdividing, and mechanizing the tasks at hand 
(always with an eye toward greater productivity), what work existed was 
effectively eliminated, leaving only labor to be done. And while the tools and 
instruments employed may ease the pain and the effort involved, they do not 
change the necessity itself, but only hide it from our senses. 
Part of the liberal philosophy that is our modern heritage is the assumption 
that if labor power is not spent and exhausted in the drudgery of life, it will 
automatically nourish other, "higher" activities. Freed from labor, people will 
pursue higher goals and ends. This was an assumption put forth as a policy by 
Adam Smith and a hope by Karl Marx; it lies behind contemporary concerns 
over what people will do with their leisure once they achieve it. Two hundred 
years after Smith and a hundred years after Marx, we intuitively know the 
fallacy of this reasoning: 
The spare time of the animal laborans is never spent in anything but consump-
tion, and the more time left to him, the greedier and more craving his appetites. 
That these appetites become more sophisticated, so that consumption is no 
longer restricted to the necessities but, on the contrary, mainly concentrates on 
the superfluities of life, does not change the character of this society, but 
harbors the grave danger that eventually no object of the world will be safe 
from consumption and annihilation through consumption. (Arendt 1958, p. 
133.) 
We claim, proudly, that we live in a consumer society, in an "economy of 
abundance." Inasmuch as labor and consumption are but two stages of the 
same process, imposed upon people by the necessity of life, to proclaim that we 
live in a consumer society is to proclaim at the same time that we live in a society 
of laborers (Arendt 1958, p. 126). Hence, a society that does not work, labors, 
and a laboring society is a consuming society. 
Not inconsequentially, we treat all use objects (the rightful products of 
work) as though they were consumer goods, so that a chair or a table is 
consumed as rapidly as a dress, and a dress is used up almost as quickly as food. 
We no longer use the worldly things around us, respecting and preserving their 
inherent durability, but "consume, devour, as it were, our houses and furniture 
and cars as though they were the "good things" of nature which spoilt uselessly 
if they are not drawn swiftly into the never-ending cycle of man's metabolism 
with nature" (Arendt, pp. 125-26). This mode of intercourse with the things of 
the world is perfectly adequate to the way they are produced. As the industrial 
revolution progressively replaced workmanship with labor, the things of the 
modern world have become products of labor. It is the natural fate of labor 
products to be consumed, unlike work products, which are there to be used. 11 ! 
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The Primacy of Work over Consumption 
There is no need to deny our zoological status, that we share something with the 
rest of the animal kingdom. Neither is there need to deny that there is a deep 
gulf between us and the rest of the animal kingdom. What we share with the rest 
of the animal kingdom is the necessity to be metabolically united with the rest 
of nature-we mus~ consume. Where we are different, at least potentially, is in 
our need and capacity for work. Those systems of human activities that we call 
work are what define and determine the circle of humanity. No other animal 
works. 
This duality was recognized by Milton Friedman when he noted that "Each 
of us is a producer and also a consumer" (1962, p. 143). Nevertheless, as Adina 
Schwartz has pointed out, the classical liberal/neoconservative tradition essen-
tially holds that we "should not care about what persons do at work" (1982, p. 
635). There is always a great deal of concern for the consumer's welfare, but 
not much for that of the worker. All social and political policy is, in the last 
resort, measured and gauged against its ultimate effect on "the consuming 
public." The concept of work is not even in the marketer's lexicon except in the 
form of "occupation" and then it is as a variable for segmenting consumer 
~a~kets. Advertisers ha~e recently discovered, however, that people generally 
dislike and even hate theu work and that this can be exploited for commercial 
purposes just as "t?e striving for superiority and the needs for love, security and 
e~cape from lonelmess" have been exploited "to sell toothpaste, deodorants, 
cigarettes, and even detergents" (Kassarjian and Sheffet 1981, p. 162). 
. Why, if each of us is "a producer and also a consumer," has the producer 
~n _e~ch of us been given a back seat to the consumer in each of us, particularly 
if it is our patterns of work that define and determine the circle of humanity. 
H~w is it "obvious," as John Maynard Keynes wrote, that "the sole end and 
ob1ect of all economic activity" is consumption (1936, p. 104)? How could 
Adam S_mi~~ write that "Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all 
production (1776/1937, p. 625). What decree authorized that social and 
~sychological _priority be given to consumption and that "sovereignty" (the 
~1ght_ to rule, duect, and control a sociopolitical body) be vested in the consum-
~ng ~·?e of our selves? Why are social tensions analyzed and economic policies 
1ust1f1e_d ~y recourse to the welfare of animal laborans rather than Homo faber? 
W1thm the Western social science tradition, Karl Marx was the only writer 
to break with the liberal tradition to focus on work and to be concerned about 
wh~t pe~ple do at work a~d what work does to people. Although a great many 
so~10log1sts~ anthrop?lo~1sts, and psychologists share these concerns today 
(without bemg Marxists m a strict sense of the word), it is still true that our 
co°:temporary social scientific understandings of what constitutes the degra-
dation of work owe much to Marx. The Marxian tradition is not the only 
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tradition that places primacy of concern on work and the conditions of work 
rather than on consumption. All religious traditions place primacy of impor-
tance on work over consumption. It is only the liberal tradition of the West that 
has reversed the ordering and given pride of place to consumption over work. 
Protestantism 
The United States is overwhelmingly a Protestant country. Protestant doctrine, 
primarily in the form of the Puritan formulations, significantly informs our 
beliefs, institutions, and sense of righteousness. When we speak of the Protes-
tant ethic, however, it must be realized that there are two sides to it. One side 
is generally identified as the Protestant work ethic, the other as the Puritan 
consumption ethic. They are, however, two sides of the same coin. 
In the Puritan/Protestant conception, God calls every person to serve Him 
by serving society and oneself in some useful, productive occupation. The 
emphasis is always on productivity for the benefit of society. In the Protestant 
formulation, work is not something done for itself or even for "the self," but for 
others, for society, for the community, for one's neighborhood, and-perhaps 
most importantly-for reasons of religious sanction. Work has primarily an 
extrinsic source of meaning as the satisfactions from work are gained in the 
knowledge that one is helping others, doing for others, and, thus, serving God. 
Every Christian has a "general calling" to serve God and a "personal calling," 
in the words of Cotton Mather, "by which his Usefulness, in his Neighbor-
hood, is distinguished." 
As an ethic, the Puritan/Protestant prescription is two-pronged-it is good 
to produce, but bad to consume any more than necessary. How much is 
necessary? Enough, but no more than needed, to maintain one's social position 
and to perform one's social duty. Indeed, the original condemnation of debt, 
which is very much a part of the ethic, was not that it threatened or revealed 
anything negative about the character of the individual borrowing the money, 
but that it left that much less for the person loaning the money to use in 
performing his social duty. As regards possessions accumulated, people are but 
the stewards of those possessions. If a person indulges in luxurious living, that 
much less will be available with which to support the church and society. 
People who needlessly consume their substance, either from carelessness or 
from sensuality, demonstrate failure to honor the God who furnished it. That 
is why the Puritan/Protestant temperament was and is uncomfortable with the 
prosperity that diligent effort produces (Morgan 1967; Shi 1985, chapter 1). 
God gives prosperity, but can use it as temptation, leading to idleness, sloth, 
and extravagance. Indeed, in Calvin's idea of predestination, it was God's will 
that everyone must work, but it was not God's will that one should lust after the 
fruits even of one's own labor. For the Puritans, a godly man worked diligently 
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at his calling, not in order to accumulate personal wealth, but to add to the 
comfort and convenience of the community. 
On Human Work 
Pope John Paul H's recent encyclical On Human Work clearly states that work 
is a perennial topic because it is a fundamental aspect of human existence.1 As 
a topic, it is always relevant and constantly demands renewed attention and 
decisive witness. It is, he wrote, a "basic dimension of human existence." The 
source of the Catholic Church's conviction that work is a, if not the, funda-
mental dimension of human experience is the Bible. The Book of Genesis states 
that man has been created "in the image of God," in the image of his "creator," 
the "Creator" of the Universe. It is God the Creator, not God the Consumer.2 
The Pope makes an important distinction between work in the objective 
sense and work in the subjective sense. The object of work is to gain dominion 
over the earth so as to produce those things that people need. This is, indeed, the 
point of emphasis in liberal thought. But there is also a subject of work. In a 
subjective sense, the meaning of work is the person: "the proper subject of 
work continues to be man" (p. 378). And again, "As a person, man is therefore 
the subject of work" (p. 379). The entire encyclical is concerned with the 
subject, not the object, of work. 
As people work, they perform various actions belonging to the work 
process. Independently of their objective content, these actions must all serve 
"to realize his humanity, to fulfill the calling to be a person that is his by reason 
of his very humanity" (p. 379). The value of work is not in the kind of work 
being done, not even in the results of that work, but in the fact that the one who 
is doing it is a person. The primary value of work lies with people, themselves, 
as the subjects of work, not with the object of it. Overall, one must recognize 
the preeminence of the subjective meaning of work over the objective one 
because "in the final analysis, it is man who is the purpose of the work" because 
"through work man ... achieves fulfillment as a human being and indeed, in a 
sense, becomes 'more of a human being'" (pp. 380, 383). 
When people work, they would like the fruit of that work to be used by 
themselves and by others. People like to feel useful; they like what they produce 
to be useful and to be used by others. People also like to handle the materials, 
to see them take shape as imagined because work has a creative aspect to it. It 
is, indeed, the only means of extending the human personality into nature. That 
is why people like to take part in the work process as sharers in responsibility 
as well as sharers in creativity. What is wanted is not only due remuneration for 
their work, but also to know that in their work, even on something that is 
owned in common, they are working "for themselves," are "producing" the 
self, and are developing their capacities as creative human beings to the fullest. 
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The Pope is unequivocal: "The church's teaching has always expressed the 
strong and deep conviction that man's work concerns not only the economy 
but also, and especially, personal values" (p. 386). While he does allude to the 
goods that result from the production process, he insists that human beings are 
also part of the result of the production process and that is why work has the 
priority: "work is 'for man' and not man 'for work'" (p. 380). 
The American Work Ethic 
The American work ethic has always included the "other-worldly" work-as-
a-duty orientation of Protestantism. But it has always included conceptions of 
personal independence, self-regulation, and individual creativity (Gutman 
1977; Rodgers 1978). These latter elements are generally considered to be 
derived from the Renaissance view of work, but they are strikingly similar to 
those understandings that motivate the encyclical On Human Work. 
Americans generally view work as something that can be and should be 
intrinsically meaningful even if productive work is, at the moment, what most 
ordin~ry people dislike. The meaning of work is considered to lie, in part, in the 
work itself and not only in an ulterior realm or consequence. Not income, not 
salvation, not status, not power over other people, but the work process itself 
is seen as at least potentially gratifying. This has been described as the work-
as-craftsmanship model (Mills 1956, pp. 215-38). 
What is necessary for work-as-craftsmanship is that some tie between 
product and producer exist at the psychological level. It is less important that 
the producer actually own the product than that it be "owned" in the sense of 
knowing what goes into it by way of skill, sweat, and material and that the skill 
and sweat be visible in the result. 
Craftspeo~le have an image of the completed product. Even though they 
may not make 1t all themselves, they see their place and their part in the whole, 
thereby understanding the meaning of their exertion in terms of that whole. 
Sati~factio~, indeed fulfillment, is derived from the sense of accomplishment, of 
havmg achieved or reproduced that "image." The inner relation between the 
craftspe~son and the thing made, from the image first formed of it through its 
complet10n, goes beyond the mere legal relations of property and makes the 
craftsperson's will to work spontaneous, even exuberant. All human activities 
have _an element of travail and vexation because they involve the expenditure of 
phy~1cal and mental energy. The craftsperson is carried over it, not by the 
feelmg of need, but by the feeling of keen anticipation. 
Craftspeople have control-they can begin work according to their own 
plan and are free to modify its form and the manner of its creation as they go 
along. Craftspeople are the masters of the activity and of themselves in the 
process. The craftsperson's work is thus a means of developing skills as well as 
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a means of developing oneself as a person. Self-development might be a motive, 
but it is also the cumulative result of devoting oneself to and practicing one's 
skills. 
On Work and Consumption: The Historic 
It is understandable how early Protestantism, particularly in the United States, 
could omit concern with the intrinsic aspects of the meaning of work. As late as 
1840, the United States was largely preindustrial in its manufacturing proc-
esses. Except for the textile industries, manufacturing was conducted, not in 
the factory, but in the workshop, and was organized along the traditional 
model of masters and journeymen. It was, indeed, a society of yeoman farmers, 
small businesspeople, and self-supporting craftspeople. 
In such a social economy, the aesthetic satisfaction of creating things, as 
well as the satisfaction of knowing that one has served others through what one 
has created and has distinguished oneself "in his Neighborhood," could be 
directly experienced. In this and all previous societies, the work of artisans and 
even that of the immense mass of the population engaged in crop or animal 
husbandry as farmers, peasants, and serfs was, as a rule, conducted autono-
mously. So far as the direct processes of work and labor are concerned, artisans 
and peasants, even in slave and feudal societies, worked according to tradi-
tional methods generally under their own control. This contrasts with contem-
porary industrial societies where many people work at jobs in which they are 
hired to perform specific series of actions such as assembly line work, key-
punching, or clerking on an automated checkout line. These jobs provide 
almost no opportunity to formulate aims, decide on means, or adjust goals and 
methods in the light of experience. As Adina Schwarz expresses it: 
Instead of being hired to achieve certain goals and left to select and pursue 
adequate means, workers are employed to perform precisely specified action. 
Even the order in which they perform those operations, the pace at which they 
work, and the particular bodily movements they employ are largely deter-
mined by others' decisions. When the entire job consists of such mechanical 
activity, workers are in effect paid for blindly pursuing ends that others have 
chosen, by means that they judge adequate. (1982, pp. 634-35). 
The "masters" take over the entire process, repeatedly reshaping it and 
reorganizing it, parceling it out as tasks to laborers for whom the process as a 
whole is now lost. The ownership of the tools and instruments of production is 
transferred to others, the ownership of the product is transferred to others, and 
the ownership of the proceeds from the sale of the product is transferred to 
others. First the capitalist and today "management" controls these things. 
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Everything about the productive process has become foreign to the workers in 
the sense that everything is outside their interests, claim, and/or control. It 
amounts to nothing less than the mass degradation of work (Braverman 1974; 
Terkel 1974). 
Consumerism and the Degradation of Work 
There is a distinct connection between consumerism (the acceptance of con-
sumption as the way to self-development, self-realization, and self-fulfillment) 
and the degradation of work. If meaningful work is systematically denied to a 
people, then obviously they must seek their meanings elsewhere. It should be no 
surprise that the search was directed into the realm of consumption. As T.J. 
Jackson Lears expressed it, "A quest for self-realization througli consumption 
[has] compensated for a loss of autonomy on the job" (1983,p. 29). But we all 
realize that no matter how much we try to convince ourselves to the contrary, 
the satisfaction derived from consumption is not the same as the sense of 
accomplishment, joy, and fulfillment that producing something engenders. 
Surrogate satisfiers are always inferior. 
With the introduction and application of scientific management to the 
division of labor plus the mechanization of the productive process, work was 
reduced to an industrial labor routine. Two situations followed. First, as Loren 
Baritz (1960) has discussed, new forms of labor discipline had to be found or 
devised in order to deal with the problems of "motivation" and "morale" that 
arose when workers lost control of the design and rhythm of work. Second, the 
laboring middle class had to be encouraged to find in consumption that 
satisfaction and fulfillment that could no longer be found in work. 
The second problem required a multifold attack. What was left of the 
original Protestant ethic's emphasis on frugal living had to be eradicated. The 
Puritan consumption ethic guided people to find satisfaction in work, not in 
consumption. The country had been flooded with a welter of goods that 
threatened to cause havoc unless people accelerated their spending. A newspa-
per editorial at the time proclaimed that the American's "first importance to his 
country [was] no longer that of citizen but that of consumer. Consumption is a 
new necessity" (as quoted in Shi 1985, p. 219). Consequently, the public had to 
be taught the joys of consumerism; the springs of impulse buying had to be 
uncoiled. This was largely the role of advertising. Writing in the Encyclopedia 
of the Social Sciences (1922), Leverett S. Lyon claimed that "Advertising is the 
greatest force at work against the traditional economy ... [and] almost the 
only force at work against puritanism in consumption" (as quoted in Ewen 
1976, p. 57). 
This meant, however, that use goods, the proper products of work, had to 
be treated as consumption goods. Writing in Printer's Ink in 1930, Earnest 
Elmo Calkins declared, "consumption engineering must see to it that we use up 
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the kinds of goods we now merely use" (as quoted in Salgo 1973, p. 31). · 
Similarly, Leon Kelley wrote in Printer's Ink (1936): 
It grows more and more apparent that the modern cycle of over-production 
and market-glutting leaves practically no room for mankind's old ideas about 
long lasting products ... Above all, we face the task of selling the whole 
public away from the deep-rooted idea of durability (as quoted in Salgo, pp. 
31-32). 
This also was the role of advertising. As an executive of General Motors 
proclaimed in 1929: "Advertising is in the business of making people healthily 
dissatisfied with what they have in favor of something better. The old factors of 
wear and tear can no longer be depended upon to create a demand. They are too 
slow" (as quoted in Salgo, p. 31). 
What was needed, as Otis Pease noted in The Responsibility of American 
Advertising (1958), was for advertisements to "create in their middle class 
readers a frame of mind that constantly sought new acquisitions" (as quoted by 
Salgo, p. 2 7). Articles that did not wear out or were not consumed were thought 
of as business tragedies; one common approach, articulated by silver and 
watch manufacturers, was to ridicule the past from which the use goods came, 
those "ancestral heirlooms 'woefully outmoded' " then being used rather than 
used up (as quoted in Salgo, p. 27). 
It was also realized, as Printer's Ink editorialized in 1919, that "if we 
encourage Gusseppi, the track laborer, to wear silken pajamas we must not 
complain when he strikes for more pay" (as quoted in Salgo, p. 27). The 
solution here was not so much to provide those higher wages (although real 
wages were rising) as to provide-at interest-the funds for the purchase of 
those silken pajamas. 
Nothing is more obvious yet more overlooked than the simple fact that 
mass production, which (whether or not it invariably included a tremendous 
degradation of work) required mass consumption for ultimate success. Daniel 
Bell points out that while a number of technological revolutions made mass 
production possible, mass consumption was made possible by several specific 
social inventions, including the development of marketing, "which rational-
ized the art of identifying different kinds of buying groups and whetting 
consumer appetites," and the spread of installment buying, which, more than 
any other social device, "broke down the old Protestant fear of debt" (1976, 
pp. 66-72). American capitalism changed its nature in the 1920s, Bell wrote, 
"by encouraging the consumers to go into debt, and to live with debt as a way 
of life" (pp. 242, 69). 
The tremendous increase in indebtedness in our time is widely viewed as 
reflecting a change in popular attitudes and behavior. Indeed it does. But the 
increase in indebtedness can only be understood for what it is if it is seen as an 
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integral part of the whole. An increase in consumer debt, as Galbraith has 
pointed out (1976, chapter 13), is implicit in the process by which consumer 
appetites are whetted. Any society prepared to spend billions of dollars to 
persuade people of their wants must also find ways to finance those wants. That 
largely means that it must be prepared to persuade consumers of the ease and 
desirability of incurring debt to realize their wants. 
The old value pattern that defined achievement as doing and making, and 
in which people displayed their character in the quality of their work, was 
intentionally and systematically replaced by a value pattern in which achieve-
ment was redefined to emphasize status and taste. The importance of doing was 
replaced by the importance of having as the citizen-craftsperson was replaced 
by the citizen-consumer. In a very real sense, a culture of production and 
creation was replaced by a culture of consumption (Ostreicher 1981). 
Conclusion 
We are at a point, then, where marketers must realize that if they sincerely want 
to contribute to a better and a higher quality of life, they must broaden their 
philosophical domain (their area of concern) and embrace much more than 
what has hitherto been embraced within the rubric of "marketing." They will 
have to realize that much consumption is necessary, but much of it today is part 
of a larger pattern of dependence, disorientation, and loss of control (Daun 
1983). Consequently, there is little that marketing can do to enhance the 
quality of life as long as it is primarily concerned with maximizing the market's 
consumption of goods and services. Indeed, marketing might be expected to 
decrease, rather than increase, the quality of life in direct proportion to the 
vigor with which it pursues that traditional purpose. 
Such a stance, however, would ally marketing with traditional social critics 
against the mainstream of the liberal tradition. It would also ally marketing 
with the women's movement, the ecology movement, and any number of other 
contemporary social change movements. These movements have a very differ-
ent worldview than either traditional management or traditional labor as they 
embody or prefigure the sense that it is possible to live better by working 
differently and/or consuming less (Gorz 1980, 1982). To ally with such move-
ments may pit marketers against those for whom they have traditionally 
worked, but it may also put marketing on the side of the future (Milbrath 
1984). 
Macromarketing researchers who want to understand consumption be-
havior in contemporary United States must move beyond the study of con-
sumption by itself. Particularly, any attempt to understand prevailing patterns 
of consumption must have a historical perspective, one with a broader domain 
and embrace than the simple sphere of consumption by itself. Historians are 
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beginning to understand the ways in which industrialization altered the daily 
lives of nineteenth century workers and the resulting evolution of working class 
culture (Dawley 1976; Edwards 1979; Nelson 1975). They are discovering 
that the process of industrialization took place within an atmosphere of deep 
ambivalence, not only among workers, but also among those who have previ-
ously been characterized as uncritical supporters of modernization. We have 
yet to fully confront the psychological reorientation that accompanied this 
development, although some progress is being made here, too (Fox and Lears 
1983). That psychological reorientation is what the culture of consumption is 
all about. It would seem to be properly part of marketing as a discipline since it 
is related to marketing as a professional activity and to one of the central areas 
of marketing's concern-consumer behavior. Marketers must understand that 
it cannot be really understood without an equally detailed understanding of the 
entire process, including what happened to work. 
Finally, those macro marketers who see themselves as change agents con-
cerned with transforming our society and economy into one that serves life, 
rather than just living, might take their cue from Eric Fromm when he wrote: 
The transformation of our society into one which serves life must change the 
consumption and thereby change, indirectly, the production pattern of present 
industrial society. Such a change would obviously not come as a result of 
bureaucratic orders but of studies, information, discussion, and decision 
making on the part of the population, educated to become aware of the 
difference between life-furthering and life-hindering kinds of needs. (1968, p. 
120) 
Fromm, however, had things backward in that the transformation of our 
society into one which serves life must start by changing the patterns of work 
and thereby change, indirectly, the patterns of consumption. But he was correct 
that it cannot be the result of bureaucratic orders handed down from above but 
the result of studies, information, discussion, and decision making on the part 
of everybody. And in this, marketing educators can play a significant role. 
But what of marketing as management technology? It will occupy the same 
role it occupies now, however much changed in scope and importance. Mar-
keting as management technology will still be concerned with, as Kotler 
expresses it, "influencing the level, timing, and composition of demand in a 
way that will help the organization achieve its objectives. Simply put, market-
ing management [will still be] demand management" (1984, p. 15, emphasis in 
original). The objectives of the organization, however, will not lie solely with 
the expansion of capital and thereby serving the needs, wants, desires, hopes, 
dreams, and philosophies of "management." It will also lie with the expansion 
and creation of meaningful work for all, thereby serving the needs, wants, 
desires, hopes, and dreams of all people as workers, citizens, family members, 
community members, and consumers. 
Work, Consumption, and the Joyless Consumer • 249 
Notes 
1. All page references to the encyclical are to the excerpted version in Williamson 
Evans, and Rustad (1985, pp. 375-89). ' 
2. This expression is mine and is not similarly expressed in the encyclical On 
Human Work. 
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The Social Construction of 
Consumption Patterns: 
Understanding Macro Consumption 
Phenomena 
A. Fuat Ftrat 
The Questions 
By 1974 (the last year for which ownership statistics were published in the U.S. 
Statistical Abstract, 1978), 83.8 percent of all households in the United States 
owned automobiles. The proportion of ownership in the same year for televi-
sion sets was 96.6 percent. For refrigerators, it was 98.9 percent, and for 
washing machines, it was 71.9 percent. 
Why have these products become so diffused among households, and so 
universally purchased and consumed in advanced market economies? Why is 
there no interest within marketing and consumer behavior disciplines in ex-
plaining this phenomenon? What are the forces behind the growing universal-
ity of consumption of certain products in the First World and increasingly in the 
Third World? Does this have anything to do with the "irrational" choices made 
by the poor and disadvantaged consumers in society? 
The theoretical framework presented briefly in this chapter was developed 
to try and answer such questions. While to some, the large proportions of 
ownership reproduced above may be sufficient reason to believe that such 
products are indispensable in human life, such brushing aside of the issue is 
neither scientific nor pragmatic. However, such large proportions may par-
tially explain the reason why, in the models of behavior in marketing, the need 
for a certain product (for example, a car or a television set) is taken for granted 
and the product features/brand choice process is studied. 
Consumption choices, it must be recognized, take place at different levels. 
For example, there is the consumption mode choice: car versus public trans-
